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ACHILLE LAURO MISSED THE BOAT: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S REFUSAL IN CHASSER v. ACHILLE LAURO
LINES TO HEAR DEFENDANT'S INTERLOCUTORY
APPEAL UNDER COLLATERAL ORDER EXCEPTION
Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code confers to the United
States courts of appeal jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of
the United States district courts.' Under section 1291, an appellant may not

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 1291 of the Federal Judicial Code
grants to the United States courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear all appeals from final decisions
of the United States district courts. Id.; see 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LucAS, MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.02[1] (1988) (stating that § 1291 authorizes appeal from final
decisions); 15 C. WiuGHr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AN

PROCEDURE §

3901 (1976 & Supp. 1988) (describing § 1291 as basic source of jurisdiction for courts of
appeals). A district court issues a final decision when the district court has heard an action to
its logical conclusion and will take no further action in the case except for the execution of
judgment. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining final decision); 9 J.
MooRE, B. WARD & J. LucAS, supra, 110.0811] (discussing general definition of final
decision). By comparison, an interlocutory decision is a decision of a district court that does
not end the litigation on the merits, but rather resolves an incidental issue arising from the
underlying merits. See Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233 (discussing interlocutory decision); J. MOORE,
B. WARD & J. LUCAS, supra, 110.08[1] (describing orders that courts have found interlocutory); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra, § 3915 (defining nonfinal interlocutory
orders). When a district court issues an interlocutory order, the action continues in the district
court. See Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233-234 (describing final and nonfina orders); J. MOORE, B.
WARD & J. LUCAS, supra,
110.08[1] (stating that action continues in district court when
district court issues interlocutory decision).
Section 1291 gives litigants an appeal as of right. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (providing appeals from all final decision of district courts); C. WRioHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra, § 3901 (stating that § 1291 provides appeal as of right); Comment,
Qualified Immunity Defense that Fails to Meet the Collateral Order Requirements is Not
Subject to Interlocutory Appeal, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 502, 502 n.1 (1985) (discussing
statutory right of appeal under § 1291); also FED. R. APP. P. 3-4 (governing appellate

procedure in appeals of right).
While § 1291 gives litigants an appeal from final decisions, § 1292 of Title 28 of the
United States Code governs appeals from interlocutory decisions of the district courts to the
circuit courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986) (governing interlocutory appeals
to federal circuit courts). Section 1292 tempers the final judgment rule in § 1291 by allowing
litigants to appeal some nonfinal decisions. Id. Section 1292(a) lists the type of decisions that
litigants may appeal as of right at the interlocutory stage, while § 1292(b) authorizes a litigant
to appeal a nonfinal decision, subject to the discretion of both the district court and the court
of appeals. See id. (providing methods of interlocutory appeal); Comment, supra, at 502 n.1
(stating that § 1292(a) gives litigants statutory right of appeal and § 1292(b) provides appeal
at discretion of both district court and circuit court).
Section 1292(b) gives the district judge discretion to certify interlocutory orders for
immediate appeal at the request of the appealing party if the district judge believes that the
order determines a question of law which controls the case, on which views may differ, and
that an immediate appeal would substantially promote a decisive conclusion to the litigation.
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appeal a decision of a district court to Lcircuit court until the district court
has rendered a final decision (final judgment rule). 2 A district court renders
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An
Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 75-81 (spring 1984) [hereinafter
INTERLOCuTORY RESTATEMENT] (reviewing appeals under § 1292(b)). Even if the district judge

certifies the action for immediate appeal, the court of appeals has discretion not to hear the
case. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (describing rule of
§ 1291 that requires parties to wait until trial is over to appeal all claims of error in trial
court as final judgment rule); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)
(referring to finality requirement of § 1291 as the final judgment rule).
In the United States the final judgment rule of § 1291 originated in § 22 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789. 1 Stat. 73, 84 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. IV 1986)).
Congress derived the concept of the final judgment rule from English laws. See, Crick, The
FinalJudgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 541-548 (1932) (reciting history of
final judgment rule in England before American Revolution). In England, the finality rule was
applicable to the courts of law, but not to the courts of equity. Id. at 547. After the American
Revolution, Congress included a version of England's finality rule in the Judiciary Act of
1789. Id. at 549. Unlike the English version of the finality rule, in the United States the final
judgment rule applied to both courts of law and courts of equity. Id. at 548. Strict application
of the final judgment rule resulted in unfairness to litigants in some decisions in equity courts.
Id. As a result, American courts developed intricate exceptions to avoid the strict application
of the final judgment rule, such as the collateral order exception. Id. See generally C. WRIorr,
A. MILER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3906 (discussing history of final judgment rule). The
Supreme Court has noted that Congress enacted the finality rule to promote the efficiency of
the federal court system; to limit disruptions, delays and expense to litigants that cause pretrial
appeals; to decrease the burden on appellate court dockets; and to allow district judges
unhampered supervision of pretrial and trial procedures. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned
Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, - (1987) (holding that finality rule protects variety of
interests related to judicial efficiency); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430
(1985) (holding that the final judgment rule gives deference to trial judge's decisions at
interlocutory stage); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (stating
that final judgment rule gives deference to trial judge's decisions, prevents piecemeal litigation,
and limits harassment of just claims by procedural delays); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (stating that § 1291 promotes efficient judicial administration by avoiding
piecemeal litigation); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (holding that
piecemeal appeals retard judicial administration). See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 1, § 3907 (discussing various purposes of final judgment rule).
In allowing appellate courts to hear all appealable issues at one time under the final
judgment rule, Congress recognized that more than one order during the litigation may be
erroneous and grounds for reversal on appeal. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc.v. Koller, 472 U.S.
424, 430 (1985) (noting that district court rules on many decisions of law and fact before final
decision). Thus, Congress enacted § 1291, the final judgment rule, which requires litigants to
bring all errors resulting from a single trial at one time. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp.
1986). As a result, courts and litigants save time and expense because the litigants take one
appeal to one appellate court. Richardson-Merrell,472 U.S. at 430. Thus, the appellate court
can correct all errors at one time. Id.
Although courts state that the final judgment rule has many purposes, in formulating
the rule, Congress did not explain why it limited appeals to final decisions. See C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3906 (discussing lack of congressional records to aid
in learning Congress's purpose in enacting final judgment rule). The legislative history of the
congressional debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789 is not helpful in determining Congress'
purpose in enacting the final judgment rule. Id; see 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 48-50 (J. Gales ed.
1789) (providing little evidence of Congress' intent in enacting final judgment rule).
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a final decision when the court decides a case on the merits and the only
remaining task is to execute the judgment.3 Once a district court has rendered
a final decision, section 1291 gives litigants an appeal as of right. 4 Accordingly, the final judgment rule avoids piecemeal litigation and promotes

judicial efficiency by preventing appellate courts from ruling on interlocutory
issues that may become moot by the end of the litigation and by allowing
the appellate court to hear all the appealable issues from a case at one

time.'
Although the language of section 1291 only appears to permit appeals

to courts of appeal from final decisions, the United States Supreme Court
has created an exception to the final judgment rule, which is commonly
known as the collateral order exception. 6 The collateral order exception

3. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining "final decision" as
decision that disposes of entire case and adjudicates all rights in cause of action leaving nothing
for district court to do except execute judgment); also INTEBROCuToRY RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, 26-28 (describing form of final decision).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. IV 1986); see supra note I (discussing appeal as of right
under § 1291).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp. 1986). An example of an interlocutory decision that
may become moot before the end of the litigation is a denial of a motion to certify an action
as a class action. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978). A decision not to
certify an action as a class action may become moot because the district court may review
and revise the order before terminating the action. Id. See generally Annotation, Appealability
of Order Allowing Action to Proceed as Class Action Under Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 32 A.L.R. FED. 674 (1977) (discussing appealability of order certifying action as
class action in federal courts); Annotation, Appealability of Determination Adverse to Confirmation of Action as Class Action Under Rule 23 of FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 17
A.L.R. FED. 933 (1973) (discussing appealability of denial of motion to certify action as class
action). In addition to a district court's order granting or denying certification as a class
action, many other interlocutory orders present issues of appealability. See generally Annotation, Finality for Appeal of Federal Habeas Corpus Orders, 82 A.L.R. FED. 937 (1987)
(discussing appealability of federal habeas corpus orders under § 1291); Annotation, Appealability, Under 28 USCS § 1291, of Order Awarding or Denying Attorneys' Fees, 73 A.L.R.
FED. 271 (1985) (discussing appealability of grants or denials of motions to assess attorneys'
fees in federal courts); Annotation, Appealability of Discovery Order as "'final decision"
Under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1291, 36 A.L.R. FED. 763 (1978) (discussing appealability of a discovery
order as final under § 1291).
6. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 541-547 (1949) (developing
collateral order exception). See generally C. WEiGHT, A. M=LLR & E. COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 3911 (discussing development of collateral order exception and appealability of district court
orders under collateral order exception); J. MooRE, B. WARD & J. LucAs, supra note 1,
110.10 (discussing orders that are appealable under collateral order exception); INTERLoctrroRY
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, 82-92 (discussing appeal of non-final district court orders). The
United States Supreme Court developed a narrow exception to the final judgment rule in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543. In Cohen a
shareholder, who owned less than 1% of the stock of the defendant corporation, brought a
shareholder's derivative action against the directors of a corporation (the defendants). Id. at
543. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendants mismanaged and defrauded the
shareholders of the corporation. Id. The defendant corporation moved the district court to
require the plaintiff to post security for certain litigation expenses as required under a New
Jersey statute. Id. at 545; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 to 17 (1945). The district court

290

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:287

permits appeals from a few of the many orders that district courts issue

denied the defendant's motion stating that the New Jersey statute did not apply to an action
in federal court. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545. The defendant appealed the district court's decision
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id. On appeal the Third Circuit
held that courts must give a liberal and reasonable construction to the final judgment rule
under § 1291, found the decision appealable and reversed. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 &
Supp. 1986). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a
district court must enforce a state statute requiring the plaintiff to post security in an action
when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545.
On appeal, the Cohen Court considered whether the district court order denying the
defendant's motion was immediately appealable at the interlocutory stage under § 1291. Id.;
see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (granting appeals from final decisions of federal
district court to federal courts of appeal). The Supreme Court found that § 1291 prevents
litigants from appealing tentative, informal or incomplete district court decisions. Cohen, 337
U.S. at 546. The Supreme Court found that, although the district court's decision was not a
final decision under § 1291, the district court's decision in Cohen belonged to a small class
of cases in which a district court's decision conclusively determines a claim of right that is
separate from, and collateral to the substantive rights the litigants claimed in the litigation.
Id. The Supreme Court stated that courts of appeal should review some rights that are
independent of, but important to, the substantive cause of action even though the orders are
not final decisions. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court created the collateral order exception
to the final judgment rule. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court held that thedefendant's motion was
immediately appealable because the district court conclusively had determined that the plaintiff
must post the security, and because the posting of security was not an element of the underlying
cause of action. Id. at 546-547. The Supreme Court also reasoned that the district court's
denial of the defendant's motion was immediately appealable because the defendant's right to
require plaintiff to post security presented the court with a serious and unsettled question. Id.
The Supreme Court noted that if the court did not allow the defendant to appeal the security
issue at the interlocutory stage, the defendant's right to require the security would become
meaningless. Id. The Supreme Court in Cohen explained that the defendant's right would
become meaningless because the plaintiff would have caused the corporation to expend its
resources on the trial without posting the statutory security, thereby violating the statute. Id.
at 546; see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950)
(holding that order vacating attachment of property was appealable under collateral order
doctrine).
After the Supreme Court in Cohen created the collateral order exception to § 1291, the
Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay refined the criteria of the collateral order
exception by delineating a three-part test. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468
(1978). First, the Supreme Court stated that the district court's order absolutely must determine
the disputed issue. Id. Second, the district court's order must resolve a significant issue that
is separate from the underlying cause of action in the case. Id. Third, the district court's order
must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment on the merits of the
substantive claim. Id. Having established a three-part test, the Supreme Court held that a
district court's denial of a motion to certify a case as a class action is not immediately
appealable under the collateral order exception because the district court's order denying the
motion failed to meet all three criteria of the collateral order exception. Id. at 469.
While courts of appeal immediately will hear an order that satisfies the collateral order
exception, courts of appeals will dismiss an interlocutory appeal if the appeal fails to meet
any one of the three criteria. See, e.g., Louisiana Ice Cream Dist., Inc. v. Carvel Corp., 821
F.2d 1031, 1033-1034 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant could not appeal denial of motion
to dismiss for improper venue under collateral order exception because motion failed to meet
second criterion of doctrine); Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Perkins, 728 F.2d 860, 862
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 890 (1984) (holding that plaintiff could not appeal
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before rendering a final decision.7 For an order to fall within the collateral

order denying motion to remand action to state court under collateral order exception because
motion failed to meet third criterion of doctrine); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763,
770-773 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff could not appeal order transferring action within
federal court system under collateral order exception because court of appeals could review
order on appeal from final decision). The third criterion of the collateral order exception is
the most difficult criterion for litigants to meet because litigants must show that the district
court order decides a claim that the litigant would lose if the litigant complied with the final
judgment rule; very few motions meet the test. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524527 (1985) (holding that denial of motion for summary judgment based on defendant's qualified
immunity from suit satisfied third criterion of the collateral order exception); also Helstocki
v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-508 (1979) (holding that denial of absolute governmental
immunity claim would be appealable under collateral order exception because right to be
protected was right not to undergo trial); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468
(1978) (stating order is appealable under collateral order exception if appellate court effectively
could not review district court's order after a final decision); Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651, 656-662 (1977) (holding denial of double jeopardy claim appealable under collateral
order exception because right to be protected is right not to be subject to trial); Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1952) (stating order is appealable under collateral order exception if
appellate court effectively could not review district court's order after a final decision); infra
notes 46-73 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's decision in Van Cauwenberghe
v. Biard narrowing third criterion of collateral order exception).
In stating that courts should interpret the collateral order exception narrowly, courts
have noted that litigants whose claims do not meet the criteria of the collateral order exception
may request that a district court certify an appeal under § 1292(b). See supra note I (discussing
types of discretionary appeals governed by § 1292(b)). See generally INTERLOCUTORY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, 19-21 (reviewing statutes governing appeals to federal circuit courts).
Courts have not required litigants to use § 1292(b) before litigants attempt to appeal an
interlocutory order under the collateral order exception. Several courts, however, that found
that the claims of the litigants were not immediately appealable under the collateral order
exception have indicated that § 1292(b) was available to litigants whose claims warranted
immediate appeal. See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (1988) (holding
that litigant could appeal order under § 1292(b) where court denied motion to dismiss based
on forum non conveniens under § 1291); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424,
435 (1985) (holding that order disqualifying counsel which is not appealable under collateral
order exception may be appropriate for appeal under § 1292(b)); Firestone Tire & Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378-379 n.13 (1981) (same); Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 819 F.2d
33, 35-37 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that availability of § 1292(b) moderated court's refusal to
hear denial of forum non conveniens motion that failed to satisfy criteria of collateral order
exception); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 766 (3d Cir. 1984)(holding that litigants
could appeal grant of motion to transfer action within the federal court system under § 1292(b)
even though order did not meet criteria of collateral order exception); also Stewart Org., Inc.
v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988) (reviewing without discussing appealability of district
court order denying motion to transfer within federal court system because district court
certified order under § 1292(b) and circuit court accepted jurisdiction).
7. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 (clarifying test for collateral order exception
as three part test and stating that collateral order exception provides immediate, appellate
review of small number of interlocutory orders). Because the final judgment rule in § 1291
promotes judicial efficiency, courts interpret the collateral order exception narrowly. See Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (creating collateral order exception
for small number of cases); United States Tour Operators Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 556 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1977) (narrowly applying collateral order exception because
final judgment rule protects important interests). If an order, however, satisfies the three
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order exception, the order must satisfy three criteria.' First, the order
conclusively must determine a serious and unsettled question.9 Second, the
appellate court must be able to decide the issue that the order raises without

discussing the merits of the action.' 0 Third, the order must be an order that
an appellate court would find unreviewable on appeal from a final decision."
Although the basic requirements of the collateral order exception are

well-established, courts differ on its applicability to particular issues.' 2
Recently, courts have disagreed in analyzing whether the collateral order
exception applies to a district court's order denying a motion to dismiss

based on a contract provision that selects the forum in which the litigants
agree to bring disputes under the contract (forum selection clause). 3 The

criteria of the collateral order exception, appellate courts will hear the appeal immediately.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has approved only a few interlocutory orders for
immediate appeal under the stringent requirements of the collateral order exception. See supra
note 6 (discussing Supreme Court's holding interlocutory orders in Cohen and Swift & Co.
Packers immediately appealable under the collateral order exception). For example, an order
denying a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable
under the collateral order exception. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656-662 (1977)
(holding that denial of double jeopardy claim is appealable under collateral order exception).
An order denying a claim of absolute immunity or qualified immunity from suit also meets
the criteria of the collateral order exception. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-530
(1985) (holding that claim of qualified governmental immunity is appealable under collateral
order exception); Helstocki v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-508 (1979) (holding that claim of
absolute governmental immunity from suit is appealable under collateral order exception).
8. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing three criteria under collateral
order exception).
9. See supra note 6 (describing first criterion of collateral order exception).
10. See supra note 6 (describing second criterion of collateral order exception).
11. See supra note 6 (describing third criterion of collateral order exception).
12. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing narrow interpretation of
collateral order exception and various orders appealable or not under the collateral order
exception).
13. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 217 (1988) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
in cruiseship passenger ticket is not appealable under collateral order exception because court
could review order on appeal from final decision). But see Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed
Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 908 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, (Dec. 21, 1988)
(holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause is immediately
appealable under collateral order exception because order would be unappealable after final
decision under § 2105); In re Diaz Contracting, Inc., 817 F.2d 1047, 1048 (3d Cir. 1987)
(same); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 355-56 (3d Cir.
1986) (same); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tlghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 196-197 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983) (same).
Courts describe a forum selection clause as a contract clause in which the parties determine
the forum where the parties will litigate disputes under the contract. See Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2241 (1988) (referring to clause which provided that parties
must bring disputes under contract in Manhattan, New York as "forum-selection clause");
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972) (referring to contract clause which
required litigants to bring disputes under contract in London, England court as forum-selection
clause); also INTERLOcUTORY RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, 96-135 (discussing reviewability of
various district court orders regarding choice of forum).
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controversy centers around the definition of "matters in abatement" as the
phrase is used in section 2105 of title 28 of the United States Code. 4 In
Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines'5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit considered whether the collateral order exception applies
16
to a denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause.
In Chasser members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

hijacked a cruise ship, Achille Lauro, which the defendant, Achille Lauro

Lines (Lauro Lines), operated.17 The PLO held hostage the passengers who
were aboard the ship. 8 As a result of injuries sustained during the hijacking,
many of the American passengers filed suits against Lauro Lines in the
United StatesDistrict Court for the Southern District of New York. 19 Lauro
Lines moved to dismiss each of the actions alleging that the passengers

could not sue Lauro Lines in New York because New York was an improper
forum.20 Lauro Lines noted that the tickets which Lauro Lines had issued
to the passengers contained a forum selection clause, which required the

14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (disallowing appellate court from reversing ruling of
lower court on "matters in abatement" that are unrelated to jurisdiction of court); infra note
31 (citing cases in which courts have discussed definition of "matters in abatement" under §
2105).
15. 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988).
16. Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 217 (1988).
17. Id.
18. Id. In addition to holding passengers hostage in Chasser, the PLO killed one
passenger, Leon Klinghoffer. Id.
19. Id. Although most of the American passengers filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Frank R. Hodes and his wife, Mildred Hodes,
who also were passengers on the cruiseship Achille Lauro when the PLO hijacked the ship,
filed suit for their injuries in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988). As in Chasser,
the defendant in Hodes moved to dismiss the action based on the forum selection clause in
the passengers' tickets. Id. at 907; see infra note 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing
Chasser defendant's motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit). The district court denied the
defendant's motion because the forum selection clause was unenforceable. Hodes, 858 F.2d at
907-908. The defendants appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether the defendant immediately could appeal
a denial of a motion to dismiss based on the forum selection clause contained in the passenger
tickets. Id. at 908. Having recently ruled on whether a denial of a motion to dismiss based
on a forum selection clause was immediately appealable, the Third Circuit in Hodes relied on
its decision in Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman WheelabratorLtd. and held that the denial of
the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the forum selection clause was immediately
appealable under the collateral order exception. Id.; see Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman
Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 194-197 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983)
(holding that defendant could immediately appeal denial of motion to dismiss based on forum
selection clause under collateral order exception); see infra notes 91-110 and accompanying
text (discussing Coastal Steel court's holding that motion to dismiss based on forum selection
clause was immediately appealable under collateral order exception).
20. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 51-52.
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passengers to bring any suits against Lauro Lines in Naples, Italy. 21 The
passengers argued that the trial court should not enforce the forum selection
clause because the clause did not adequately inform the passengers of the
rights the passengers were waiving under the clause. 22 The district court
denied Lauro Lines's motion to dismiss and refused to enforce the forum
selection clause because the clause did not notify the passengers that the
passengers were waiving the right to sue in the United States. 2 Lauro Lines
appealed the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 24
On appeal Lauro Lines argued that Lauro Lines immediately could
appeal the district court's order denying Lauro Lines's motion to dismiss
under the collateral order exception. 2 The passengers moved to dismiss the
appeal, alleging that the order did not satisfy the criteria of the collateral
order exception. 26 The Second Circuit granted the passengers' motion to
dismiss Lauro Lines's appeal on the grounds that the order was not
immediately appealable under the collateral order exception. 27 The Second
Circuit held that the district court's denial of Lauro Lines's motion to
dismiss based on the forum selection clause could be reviewed on appeal
from a final decision and, therefore, the appeal failed to meet the third
28
criterion of the collateral order exception.
In dismissing Lauro Lines's appeal for failure to meet the third criterion
of the collateral order exception, the Chasser court considered and rejected

21. Id. at 51. In Chasserthe forum selection clause included in the tickets for the cruise
required the passengers of the Achille Lauro to bring any suits arising from the cruise in
Naples, Italy. Id. The forum selection clause provided:
Art. 31-VENUE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS-All controversies that may arise
directly or indirectly in connection with or in relation to this passage contract, must
be instituted before the judicial authority in Naples, the jurisdiction of any other
authority being expressly renounced and waived ...
Brief on Behalf of Appellant Lauro Lines S.R.L. at 3, Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844
F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-9081, 87-9083, 87-9085, 87-9087, 87-9089 and 87-9091),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988) (describing forum selection clause in passenger's tickets).
22. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 51.
23. Id.at 51-52.
24. Id. at 52. Following the defendant's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Chasser, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the defendant's appeal. Id.
The plaintiffs argued that the district court's order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss
based on the forum selection clause was neither a final order under § 1291, nor an immediately
appealable collateral order under the collateral order exception. Id.
25. Id. at 52.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Chasser court held that a district court's order denying a motion to dismiss
based on a forum selection clause was effectively reviewable after a final decision. Id. Even
though the litigants would incur greater expenses because of the holding, the Chasser court
noted that the Supreme Court had explicitly stated that increased trial expenses are not a basis
for immediate appeal. Id.; see, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436
(1985) (stating that additional expense to litigants was not sufficient to set aside final judgment
rule).
28. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 55.
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the argument that section 2105 of title 28 of the United States Code prevents

review of the denial of the motion to dismiss on appeal from a final
decision. 29 The Second Circuit noted that section 2105 provides "There shall

be no reversal in the Supreme Court or a court of appeals for error in
ruling upon matters in abatement which do not involve jurisdiction." 30
Courts have defined the phrase "matter in abatement" under section 210531
to mean a motion which is unrelated to the underlying cause of action.
Courts defining the phrase explain that if a court grants the motion, the
litigants can bring the action in another forum or another pleading even
though the motion destroys the pending action.3 2 Section 2105 does not

prevent an appellate court from reviewing matters that affect the jurisdiction
of the court.33 Arguably a denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum
selection clause meets the definition of a matter in abatement. 34 However,
29. Id. at 53-54; see 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (stating that appellate courts may not
review nonjurisdictional matters in abatement). Section 2105 of Title 28 of the United States
Code provides that neither the Supreme Court nor the federal courts of appeals shall overturn
an erroneous ruling on a matter in abatement that does not affect the court's jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 2105 (1982). See generally C. Wxuaar, A. MLLER & E. CooPER, supra note 1, §
3903 (discussing § 2105).
30. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 53; see 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (preventing appellate review
of nonjurisdictional matters in abatement).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (disallowing appellate court from reversing ruling of
lower court on "matters in abatement" that are unrelated to jurisdiction of court); also
Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983) (defining "matters in abatement" as motions which, if granted
by district court, would result in the dismissal of action, but would not prevent plaintiff from
filing similar action in another forum or in another pleading); Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722
F.2d 1332, 1333 n.1 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that district court's order granting stay of
proceedings in district court so that parties could proceed to alternate remedy as stated in
contract was not "matter in abatement" under § 2105 because order ruled on merits of action);
Bowles v. Wilke, 175 F.2d 35, 37-38 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 861 (1949) (defining
"abatement" under former version of § 2105 as overthrow or destruction of pending action
apart from cause of action); McHie v. McHie, 78 F.2d 351, 352-354 (7th Cir. 1935) (discussing
definition of "abatement" under former version of § 2105). See generally 1 C.J.S. Abatement
and Revival § 1 (1985) (discussing matters in abatement); BLAcK's LAW DicrioNARY 1037 (5th
ed. 1979) (defining "plea in abatement" as plea that contests where, when or how plaintiff
asserts cause of action without disputing merits of plaintiff's cause of action).
32. See supra note 31 (discussing courts that have defined "matters in abatement").
33. See Hill v. Walker, 167 F. 241, 245 (8th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 517 (1909)
(holding that former, identical version of § 2105 permitted litigants to raise jurisdictional
questions after final decisions even though question could cause abatement of action unrelated
to cause of action); 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982). Section 2105 applies to matters relating to the
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, rather than the court's personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Hinds v. Keith, 57 F. 10 (5th Cir. 1893). The holding in Hinds
v. Keith is consistent with rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states
that any party, or any court sua sponte, may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (governing subject matter jurisdiction). Rule 12(h)(1), however,
states that a defendant waives his right to contest the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
if the party asserting the court's lack of personal jurisdiction does not raise the issue of the
court's jurisdiction in a timely manner. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(l) (governing personal
jurisdiction).
34. See supra note 31 (citing cases in which courts have defined "matters in abatement").
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as the Second Circuit in Chasser noted, appellate courts have reviewed
denials of motions to dismiss based on both forum non conveniens and
improper venue after final decisions without reference to section 2105's
prohibition of review based on matters in abatement. 5 Accordingly, the

35. Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 217 (1988); see 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (prohibiting appellate review of "matters in
abatement" after final decision); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1952-1953
(1988) (noting that court could review district court's order denying motion to dismiss based
on forum non conveniens after final decision while holding order not appealable under collateral
order exception); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2241-2250 (1988)
(reviewing grant of federal forum non conveniens motion); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (court reviewed grant of forum non conveniens motion after final
decision); Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 819 F.2d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying interlocutory
appeal of district court order that denied forum non conveniens motion because defendant
may appeal order after final decision); Partrederiet Treasure Saga v. Joy Mfg. Co., 804 F.2d
308, 310 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that district court's order denying forum non conveniens
motion was not immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine because order would
be reviewable on appeal from final decision); Rosenstein v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 769 F.2d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); also Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co.
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556 (1967) (reviewing denial of motion to dismiss
for improper venue after final decision); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway, 572 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1978) (reviewing denial of motion to transfer venue after final decision); Gill v.
United States, 184 F.2d 49, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1950) (reviewing denial of motion to dismiss for
improper venue after final decision).
Courts grant a defendant's motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens when
plaintiffs bring actions in forums that are so inconvenient for defendants that dismissal of the
action is appropriate. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (describing
factors courts may examine when deciding whether to grant forum non conveniens motion).
In deciding whether to grant a defendant's forum non conveniens motion, the Supreme Court
stated that courts must consider whether the forum is so inconvenient for a defendant that
dismissal of the action is appropriate. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated that courts
should consider the sources of proof available for the litigant, the compulsory service of
process available to compel witnesses to attend the trial in a particular forum, and the public's
interest in having an action tried in a particular forum require the court to dismiss the action.
Id.
On the other hand, a forum selection clause in a contract represents the parties' agreement
that the forum specified in the clause is the only proper forum in which to bring actions under
the contract. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2244 (1988) (describing
forum selection clause as significant factor for court to consider when making federal forum
non conveniens determination). The federal courts should give a forum selection clause
controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases. See id. at 243 n.7; Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (defining federal policy favoring forum selection clauses).
Courts need not consider the underlying cause of action to discuss whether the forum selection
clause is enforceable because the forum selection clause is usually a separate and distinct
provision which the court may examine separately. See CoastalSteel, 709 F.2d at 195 (describing
forum selection clause as separable from merits of underlying cause of action).
While motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens and forum selection clauses
are distinguishable, forum selection clauses and forum non conveniens motions serve similar
purposes. See Chasser, 844 F.2d at 54 (stating that forum selection clauses and forum non
conveniens motions are similar). Forum selection clauses are similar to forum non conveniens
motions in that litigants may utilize both as methods to choose where the action will be
litigated. Id.; see Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2245 (stating that parties use forum selection clauses
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court reasoned that motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens and
improper venue are not matters in abatement under section 2105.36 The
Second Circuit then concluded that denials of motions to dismiss based on
forum selection clauses in contracts are similar to denials, of motions to
dismiss based on forum non conveniens or improper venue.37 Thus, the
Chassercourt reasoned that if denials of motions to dismiss based on forum
non conveniens or improper venue were not matters in abatement under
section 2105, then matters in abatement do not include denials of motions
to dismiss based on forum selection clauses.3" In addition to basing its
holding on the similarity between motions to dismiss based on forum
selection clauses and those based on forum non conveniens, the Second
Circuit noted that a forum selection clause grants an important right that
courts should recognize and enforce, and thus, one that appellate courts
should review after judgment.3 9 The Second Circuit, therefore, held that
section 2105 does not prevent an appellate court from reviewing the district
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss after the district court had
rendered a final decision because courts have not invoked section 2105 to
bar post-judgment review of similar orders/ °
In addition to holding that section 2105 does not apply to a district
court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause,
the Chasser court noted that the language of section 2105 indicates that a
litigant cannot appeal matters in abatement under any circumstances. 4 ' The
Second Circuit stated that if section 2105 prevented an appellate court from
reviewing a court's denial of Lauro Lines' motion after a final decision,
then section 2105 seemed to prevent review of the court's order during the
interlocutory stage as well. 42 The Second Circuit thus found that section
2105 would not prevent a court of appeals from reviewing a motion to
dismiss after a final decision. 43 Accordingly, the court found that the district
court order in Chasser failed to satisfy the third criterion of the collateral
order exception and dismissed the appeal without reaching the first two

to choose forum); Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507 (holding that defendants make forum non
conveniens motion when plaintiff's choice of forum is too inconvenient for defendant).
However, the court's discussion of the choice of forum is broader under the forum non
conveniens doctrine than under a forum selection clause; a court may use a forum selection
clause to assist the court in determining whether to grant a forum non conveniens motion.
See Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2244 (describing forum selection clause as one factor for court to
consider when making federal forum non conveniens determination).
36. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 54.
37. Id.; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (comparing forum selection clause with
forum non conveniens motion).
38. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 54; see 28 U.S.C. § 2105. But see infra notes 95-103 and
accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's holding in Coastal Steel that forum selection
clause satisfied definition of "matters in abatement" under § 2105).
39. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 54.
40. Id.
41. Id.at 53.
42. Id.at 53-54.
43. Id.
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criteria of the collateral order exception." Following the Second Circuit's
decision, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Chasser
case to determine whether a defendant immediately may appeal a denial of
a motion to dismiss based45 on a foreign forum selection clause under the
collateral order exception.
After the Second Circuit's Chasser decision, the United States Supreme
Court handed down an opinion construing the collateral order exception.
In Van Cauwenberghev. Biard46 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the collateral order exception applies to a denial of a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds of immunity from civil service of process or
a denial of a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.4 7 In Van Cauwenberghe the plaintiff served the defendant with
a civil summons and complaint while the defendant was in the United States
4
under the extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland. 1
The defendant moved in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California to dismiss the action on the grounds of forum non
conveniens or, alternatively, on the grounds of immunity from civil service
of process. 49 The district court summarily denied the defendant's motion to

dismiss on both claims.50 As a result, the defendant appealed the district
court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 5'
The Ninth Circuit, in a one-line opinion, dismissed the defendant's appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.5 2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.53 The Supreme Court stated that the district court's order denying
defendant's motion to dismiss was appealable only if the district court's
4
order satisfied the three criteria of the collateral order exception
In deciding whether the district court's order satisfied the collateral
order exception, the Van Cauwenberghe court first considered whether the
defendant immediately could appeal the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss based on immunity from civil service of process

44. Id. at 53-55; see 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982). In addition to finding that § 2105 did not
prevent appellate review of the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss after a
final decision, the Chasser court noted that the defendant had not asked the district court to
certify the matter for appeal pursuant to § 1292(b). Chasser, 844 F.2d at 55; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b); supra note 1, 6 and accompanying text (describing appeals under § 1292(b)).
45. Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S.
Ct. 217 (1988).
46. 108 S. Ct. 1945 (1988).
47. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1949-1953 (1988); see supra notes 2940 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser court's holding that denial of motion to dismiss
based on forum selection clause is not appealable under collateral order exception).
48. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1948.
49. Id. at 1948-1949.
50. Id. at 1949.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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and forum non conveniens. ss The defendant argued that under an extradition

treaty, the defendant was immune from civil service of process.5 6 The
defendant further contended that immunity from civil service of process
included the right not to stand trial.5 7 Accordingly, the defendant argued
that because the treaty gave the defendant the right not to stand trial, the

district court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss could not be
effectively reviewed and corrected after a final decision. 8 Therefore, the
defendant concluded, the third criterion of the collateral order exception
was met. 9
While agreeing that the right not to stand trial is a right which the

defendant loses if the appellate court does not review the decision at the
pre-trial stage, the Supreme Court found that the right of immunity from0
civil service of process does not include the right not to stand trialA
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that a denial of a motion to dismiss

based on immunity from civil service of process did not meet the third
criterion of the collateral order exception, and was not immediately appealable. 61 Assuming that the defendant had a meritorious claim of immunity
from service of process, the Van CauwenbergheCourt stated that the critical

question in determining whether the defendant's claim met the third criterion
of the collateral order exception was whether the essence of the right that
the defendant claimed was the right not to stand trial.62 The Van Cauwen-

55. Id. at 1949-1952.
56. Id. at 1950.
57. Id. at 1950. In Van Cauwenberghethe defendant argued that the principle of specialty
in extradition law gave the defendant a right not to stand trial. Id. The United States Supreme
Court created the principle of specialty in United States v. Rauscher. United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886). In creating the principle of specialty, the Supreme Court stated that
if a court gains jurisdiction over a defendant brought under the provisions of an extradition
treaty, the court only may try the defendant for one of the offenses described in the extradition
treaty. Id. In addition the court may try the defendant only for the offense with which he is
charged in the proceeding for his extradition. Id.
58. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1950.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-527 (1985) (holding that interlocutory
order does not satisfy third criterion of collateral order exception unless defendant has right
not to stand trial). In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court noted that the issue in determining
whether the defendant's claim met the third criterion of the collateral order exception was
whether the appellant claimed immunity from suit or immunity from a binding judgment of
the court. Id. at 525. After Mitchell, litigants must claim immunity from suit in order to meet
the third criterion of the collateral order exception. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1950.
In deciding whether the essence of the right the defendant claimed was the right not to
stand trial, the Supreme Court in Van Cauwenberghe noted that all meritorious pretrial claims
essentially are a right not to stand trial. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1950. The Van
Cauwenberghe Court mentioned the ease with which litigants can transform pretrial claims for
dismissal into claims of the right not to stand trial. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1951.
The Supreme Court, however, found that the finality requirement in § 1291 demands that the
right asserted effectively would be lost if the litigant could not immediately appeal the order
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berghe Court stated that the right of immunity from service of process does
not include the right to be free from a civil trial.6 3 The Van Cauwenberghe
Court explained instead, that the right of immunity from service of process
64
is a right not to be subject to a binding judgment of a particular forum.
The Van Cauwenberghe Court reasoned that an appellate court does not
have to reverse a denial of a motion to dismiss based on immunity from
civil service of process at the interlocutory stage to protect the defendant's
right not to be bound by the judgment of a particular forum.6 5 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held that an appellate court could review the district
court's order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss based on immunity
from service of process on appeal from a final decision. 66 Finding that the
order failed to meet the third criterion of the collateral order exception, the
Van Cauwenberghe Court held that the defendant's appeal of the motion
to dismiss based on immunity from civil service of process was not an
immediately appealable collateral order. 67
In addition to deciding whether the defendant's motion to dismiss based
on immunity from civil service of process was immediately appealable, the
Van Cauwenberghe Court considered whether the denial of the defendant's
motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens met the three criteria of
the collateral order exception. 68 The Van Cauwenberghe Court analyzed the
defendant's forum non conveniens argument under the second criterion of
the collateral order exception, which provides that the district court's order
must be completely separate from the merits of the underlying cause of
action. 69 The Supreme Court noted that courts considering a forum non
conveniens motion have substantial flexibility to consider the merits of each
dispute.7 0 The Supreme Court observed that when courts inquire into the
convenience of the forum, courts consider the choice of law issues raised
by the dispute, the distance the litigants must travel, and the likelihood that
the plaintiff would find alternative forums so inconvenient that the plaintiff
would not maintain the suit. 71 The Supreme Court also noted that courts
ruling on forum non conveniens motions consider the substance ofthe dispute
between the parties to determine the availability of sources of proof which

affecting the right. Id.; see Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985) (noting
that district court's order does not satisfy collateral order exception unless litigants would lose
right which order decides if appellate court refuses to review order immediately). Accordingly,
the Supreme Court found that the right to immunity from service of process did not include
the right to avoid a civil trial. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1951.
63. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1951.
64. Id. at 1951-1952.
65. Id. at 1952.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 1953; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing criteria court may
consider when deciding whether to grant forum non conveniens motion).
71. Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1952-53.
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will be necessary during the litigation.7 2 Because courts are free to focus on
the facts of each case, the Supreme Court found that the court's decision

not to dismiss based on forum non conveniens is too deeply involved with
the underlying matter in dispute to meet the second criterion of the collateral
order exception.Y
Van Cauwenberghe is the Supreme Court's most recent decision construing the collateral order exception. 74 In Van Cauwenberghe the Supreme

Court held that neither forum non conveniens nor immunity from service
of process are sufficient grounds to justify interlocutory appeal from a
denial of a motion to dismiss. 75 The Supreme Court's reasoning in Van
Cauwenberghe may be influential when the Supreme Court considers the

Chasser case and attempts to resolve the disagreement among the circuit
courts over whether the denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum
selection clause satisfies the collateral order exception. 76 Until the Supreme
Court decides the Chasser case, the Second Circuit's opinion in Chasser
represents a majority of circuit courts holding that denials of motions to
dismiss based on forum selection clauses do not meet the third criterion of
the collateral order exception and are not immediately appealable. 77 A

72. Id. at 1953.
73. Id. at 1952-1953. Like the Van Cauwenberghe court, other courts have ruled on the
question of whether a motion to dismiss meets the second criterion of the collateral order
exception; the Supreme Court in Van Cauwenberghe polled the circuits that have ruled on the
appealability of a forum non conveniens motion under the collateral order exception. Id. at
1952 n.6. The Van Cauwenberghe court found that only one circuit had granted an appeal of
a denial of a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens under the collateral order
exception. See id. (listing courts that have held that forum non conveniens motion is not
immediately appealable under collateral order exception).
The Supreme Court acknowledged that courts would not always have to explore the
merits of a case in deciding whether to grant a forum non conveniens motion. Id. at 1953.
The Supreme Court, however, reasoned that categories of cases rather than individual fact
scenarios were determinative in formulating a rule of appealability under § 1291. Id.; see 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (governing appeals from final decisions). The Supreme Court noted that §
1292(b) allows appellate courts to review interlocutory orders in exceptional cases. Van
Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1953-1954. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that in an
appropriate forum non conveniens case, in which the merits of the underlying cause of action
are sufficiently separate from the court's analysis of the forum non conveniens motion, the
district court may certify the matter for appeal pursuant to the provisions of § 1292(b). Id.;
see supra note 6 (discussing courts' use of § 1292(b) when courts deny appeals under collateral
order exception).
74. See Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. 1950 (construing collateral order exception).
75. Id. at 1949-1953.
76. See id. at 1952, 1953 (holding that neither denial of motion to dismiss based on
forum non conveniens nor motion to dismiss based on immunity from civil service of process
was appealable under collateral order exception); supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text
(describing Second Circuit's holding in Chasser that district court order denying motion to
dismiss based on forum selection clause was not appealable under collateral order exception).
But see infra notes 91-110 and accompanying text (describing Third Circuit's holding that
district court order denying motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause was immediately
appealable under collateral order exception).
77. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 53-55 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109
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minority of circuit courts, however, hold that denials of motions to dismiss

based on forum selection clauses meet all three criteria of the collateral
order exception, and are immediately appealable collateral orders.7 s For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd.19, held that a denial
of a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause in a contract met
the three criteria of the collateral order exception and was an immediately
appealable, collateral order.80 In Coastal Steel the plaintiff, Coastal Steel

Corp. (Coastal), contracted with Sir James Farmer Norton & Co. (Farmer

Norton) to build a steel plant. 8' To obtain a part for the steel plant, Farmer
Norton sub-contracted with the defendant, Tilghman-Wheelabrator, Ltd.

(Tilghman). s2 The sub-contract contained a forum selection clause requiring
the parties to bring disputes arising out of the sub-contract in an English
court. 83 As a result of damages to Coastal's steel plant, Coastal sued
Tilghman and alleged that the component part, which Tilghman had installed
in the plant, had caused the damages.84 Because Coastal had filed a petition
S. Ct. 217 (1988) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
did not satisfy collateral order exception and was not immediately appealable); Louisiana Ice
Cream Distrib., Inc. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1032-34 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding motion
to dismiss for improper venue based on forum selection clause not immediately appealable
under collateral order exception); Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Perkins, 728 F.2d 860,
862 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 890 (1984) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss
action in federal court based on forum selection clause was not immediately appealable under
collateral order exception). But see Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d
905, 908 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
immediately appealable under collateral order exception); Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 195-197
(same); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d 848, 850-851 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss for improper venue based on forum
selection clause was immediately appealable under collateral order exception).
78. See supra note 77 (describing split among circuits on whether parties immediately
may appeal denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause under collateral order
exception).
79. 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983).
80. See Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 197 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on
forum selection clause satisfied collateral order exception); also C. WRIGur, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 1, § 3903 (Supp. 1988) (discussing Coastal Steel court's use of § 2105 to
hold denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause immediately appealable under
collateral order exception).
81. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 192. In Coastal Steel the contract between the plaintiff
and Sir James Farmer Norton & Co. (Farmer Norton) did not specify the supplier of the blast
unit. Id. The plaintiff, however, did suggest to Farmer Norton that a British firm, St. Georges
Engineers, Ltd. (St. Georges) might supply an adequate unit. Id. Farmer Norton received a
quotation from St. Georges for the production of the blast unit. Id. Tilghman Wheelabrator
Ltd. (Tilghman) acquired St. Georges. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 193. In addition to noting that the forum selection clause in the sub-contract
between Farmer Norton and St. Georges required the parties to bring any action arising out
of the sub-contract in an English court, the CoastalSteel court stated that the forum selection
clause required the court to apply English law in deciding the case. Id.
84. Id.
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for reorganization, Coastal filed its complaint against Tilghman in bankruptcy court."5 Tilghman moved to dismiss the suit under the forum selection
clause in the sub-contract and the doctrine of forum non conveniens s6 The
bankruptcy court denied Tilghman's motion to dismissY7 Tilghman appealed
the decision of the bankruptcy court to the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey.88 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's denial of Tilghman's motion to dismiss.8 9 As a result, Tilghman
appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.9
On appeal, the Third Circuit found that Tilghman immediately could
appeal the order because the order satisfied the three criteria of the collateral
order exception. 9' The Third Circuit reasoned that the district court's order
denying Tilghman's motion to dismiss met the first criterion of the collateral
order exception because the district court's denial of Tilghman's motion
finally determined a serious question: where the parties would litigate the
action. 92 In addition the Third Circuit found that the district court's order
met the second criterion of the collateral order exception because the court's
review of a forum selection clause would not require the court to discuss
the merits of the action.93 Finding that a court would not have to consider

85. Id. Although the plaintiff in Coastal Steel brought the action in bankruptcy court
with the plaintiff's petition for reorganization, the Supreme Court since has held that bankruptcy courts may not hear any collateral claims of parties in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at
199; see Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88
(1982) (holding that bankruptcy courts no longer have jurisdiction over collateral claims of
parties in bankruptcy proceedings).
86. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 193.
87. Id.
88. Id. The defendant appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of the defendant's motion
to dismiss to the district court under section 1334(b) of title 28 of the United States Code
which, at that time, allowed litigants in bankruptcy court to appeal decisions of the bankruptcy
judge to a federal district court. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1982) (giving district court
jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of bankruptcy courts).
89. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 193.
90. Id. Before appealing to the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss
to the Third Circuit under § 1291, the defendant in Coastal Steel asked the district court to
certify the appeal under § 1292(b). Id.; see supra note 1 (distinguishing § 1291 from § 1292);
supra note 6 (discussing courts that mention the utility of § 1292(b) when denying defendant's
appeal under the collateral order exception). The district court refused to certify the motion
to dismiss for immediate appeal under § 1292(b). Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 193. Therefore,
the defendant tried to appeal under § 1291 and the collateral order exception. Id.
91. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 197; see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 1291). Although the defendant in Coastal Steel only argued that the district court's order
was a final decision under § 1291, a federal bankruptcy statute required the Third Circuit to
examine all possible sources of jurisdiction over the appeal because the action arose in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 193; see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§§ 236-41, 409, 92 Stat. 2667-71, 2685 (1978) (former version of bankruptcy code requiring
appellate court to examine all possible avenues of appeal from bankruptcy proceedings).
92. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 195.
93. Id. In Coastal Steel the Third Circuit determined that the selection of a forum in a
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the merits of the underlying cause of action, the Third Circuit stated that
a forum selection clause establishes a legal right which is separate from the
94
merits of the underlying case.
In addition to finding that the district court's order satisfied the first
two criteria of the collateral order exception, the Third Circuit in Coastal
Steel found that the district court's order met the third criterion of the
collateral order exception. 95 The Third Circuit reasoned that the district
court's order met the third criterion because section 2105, which prevents
appellate review based upon non-jurisdictional matters in abatement, prevented an appellate court from reviewing the district court's order after a
final decision.96 The Third Circuit found that the district court's order
refusing to dismiss based on a forum selection clause was a matter in
abatement.9 Relying on the accepted definition of "matters in abatement,"
the Third Circuit reasoned that an appellate court's reversal of the district
court's order would terminate the action, but would not prohibit Coastal
subsequently from filing the action in a different court. 9 In addition the
Third Circuit noted that an appellate court does not address the merits of
a plaintiff's claim in deciding whether to reverse the district court's order.9
The Third Circuit noted further that a denial of a motion to dismiss based
on a forum selection clause was not a jurisdictional matter.100 Accordingly,
the Third Circuit found that a denial of a motion to dismiss based on a
forum selection clause is a "matter in abatement" within the meaning of
section 2105.101 The Third Circuit, therefore, found that the district court's
order denying Tilghman's motion to dismiss fell under section 2105 and

contractual provision is analytically distinct from the substantive cause of action that the
litigants argue in the forum. Id. The Coastal Steel court found that, like the right against
double jeopardy or the right of governmental immunity from suit, the right that a forum
selection clause establishes is separate from the cause of action. Id. The Coastal Steel court
also found that a forum selection clause provides litigants an important right that courts
should enforce. Id. Accordingly, the Coastal Steel court found that a denial of a motion to
dismiss based on a forum selection clause meets the second criterion of the collateral order
exception because the denial of the motion determines an important issue that is separate from
the merits of the underlying substantive claim. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 196-197.
96. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (preventing appellate review of nonjurisdictional
matters in abatement). But see supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser
court's holding that § 2105 does not prevent appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on
a forum selection clause after final decision).
97. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196-197.
98. Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing definition of "matters in
abatement").
99. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 197.
100. Id. at 196. The CoastalSteel court, however, did not discuss why the district court's
order denying Tilghman's motion to dismiss was not a decision based on the jurisdiction of
the court. Id.
101. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (prohibiting appellate review of nonjurisdictional
matters in abatement).
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thus met the third criterion of the collateral order exception. ie Accordingly,

the Third Circuit found that the order was immediately appealable under
the collateral order exception. 103
Although the Third Circuit in Coastal Steel found that section 2105

prevented appellate review of the district court's order after a final decision,
the Third Circuit found that section 2105 does not apply to interlocutory
appeals under the collateral order exception.104 Noting that the language of

section 2105 originated in the Judiciary Act of 1789,105 the Third Circuit
stated that when Congress enacted the Judiciary Act, Congress did not
36
provide for interlocutory appeals.1
The Third Circuit rdasoned that, because

the Judiciary Act did not include provisions for interlocutory appeal, section
2105 should not apply to interlocutory appeals. 0 7 Similarly, the Third Circuit

reasoned that because the collateral order exception did not exist when
Congress enacted the original version of section 2105, section 2105 does not
apply to an order of a district court that satisfies the collateral order
exception. 08 Having found that section 2105 prevented review of the district
102. Id. at 196.
103. Id. at 197. While the majority in Coastal Steel held that the district court's order
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss satisfied the third criterion of the collateral order
exception, the concurrence in Coastal Steel stated that the majority did not need to discuss §
2105 in order to hear the defendant's appeal. Id. at 212; see Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (holding that courts should interpret final judgment rule as
practical rather than technical). The concurrence in Coastal Steel noted that the Supreme
Court in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. granted courts of appeal discretion to hear
appeals of orders that are not final decisions, but are appeals that courts should hear
immediately. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 212-213; see Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152 (noting that
courts should give finality requirement of § 1291 practical rather than technical construction).
The concurrence in Coastal Steel recognized that courts should grant appeals under Gillespie
sparingly because the power Gillespie granted was extraordinary. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at
213. The concurrence in Coastal Steel, however, stated that the defendant could appeal the
district court's order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss under Gillespie. Id. Accordingly,
the concurrence in Coastal Steel reasoned that the majority incorrectly based its decision to
hear the defendant's appeal under the collateral order exception on § 2105. Id. at 212. The
concurrence in Coastal Steel also noted that § 2105 seems to prevent review of all nonjurisdictional matters in abatement. Id. at 212 n.6. The concurrence further reasoned that if § 2105
prevents review of a district court's order denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum
selection clause after a final decision, then § 2105 also prevents review of the order at the
interlocutory stage. Id.; see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (stating Chasser court's
reasoning that § 2105 would prevent review at all stages of litigation if § 2105 applied to
denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause).
104. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196.
105. Id.; see Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (1789) (formulating original version of
present § 2105).
106. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196. Although the original Judiciary Act did not include
provisions for interlocutory appeal, Congress later enacted § 1292. See supra note 1 (describing
§ 1292). Section 1292(a) provides circumstances when litigants have interlocutory appeals as
of right, and § 1292(b) provides for interlocutory appeals at the discretion of the trial court.
See supra note 1 (describing § 1292(a)); supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text (describing §
1292(b)).
107. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196.
108. Id.
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court's order after a final decision, but did not prevent review at the
interlocutory stage, the Third Circuit held that the district court's order
denying Tilghman's motion to dismiss met the third criterion of the collateral
order exception.'09 Because the district court's order satisfied the collateral
order exception,
the Third Circuit found jurisdiction to hear Tilghman's
0
appeal.11

Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the district court's order
denying Tilghman's alternative motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens, unlike the district court's order denying Tilghman's motion to
dismiss based on a forum selection clause, did not satisfy the collateral
order exception."' The Coastal Steel court found that the district court's
denial of the motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens did not
meet the second criterion of the collateral order doctrine because the order
was not distinct from the merits of the substantive cause of action." 2 The
Third Circuit noted that a court ruling on a forum non conveniens motion
may consider factors intermingled with the merits of the case, such as the
ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of witnesses and location
of property in dispute.13 Accordingly, the Third Circuit reasoned that an
appellate court cannot rule on a forum non conveniens motion without
considering the facts of the underlying dispute. "14 Having found that the
order did not satisfy the second criterion of the collateral order exception,
the Third Circuit determined that the denial of a motion to dismiss based
on forum non conveniens grounds was not appealable as a final order under
the collateral order exception."'
Courts that have ruled on the applicability of the collateral order
exception to denials of motions to dismiss based on forum selection clauses
have considered whether the order under consideration meets the three
criteria of the collateral order exception. 116 Courts that discuss the first
criterion of the collateral order exception agree that a denial of a motion
to dismiss satisfies the first criterion." 7 Thus, the courts agree that when
courts deny a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause, courts

109. Id. at 197.
110. Id. at 196-197.
111. Id. at 195; see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's
holding in Van Cauwenberghe that forum non conveniens motion did not meet three criteria

of collateral order exception).
112. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 195.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing circuit courts that have considered whether parties may appeal denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
under collateral order exception).
117. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrot Commodities, Inc. 806 F.2d 848, 850
(8th Cir. 1986) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
conclusively determined matter in question and met first criterion of collateral order exception);
Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 195 (same).
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have conclusively determined that the action may continue in the forum
where the defendant moved to dismiss. 1 8 Most circuit courts that have
discussed the second criterion agree that a district court's order denying a
motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause is separate from the
merits of the underlying cause of action." 9 Accordingly, a majority of circuit
courts that have discussed the second criterion hold that the order satisfies
the second criterion. 120

Courts, however, do not agree whether a district court's order denying
a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause meets the third
criterion of the collateral order exception.' 2 ' Accordingly, the circuit courts

are divided on whether an appellate court effectively can review the order
on appeal from a final decision.1' 2 In considering whether the order meets
the third criterion of the collateral order exception, the circuit courts disagree

on whether section 2105 prevents a court from reviewing the order after a
final decision.1' 3 The Second Circuit in Chasser held that a district court's
order denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause was

118. See supra note 117 (listing courts that have held district court order denying motion
to dismiss based on forum selection clause conclusively determined where parties must bring
action).
119. See Farmland Indus., 806 F.2d at 850 (holding that district court order denying
motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause satisfied second criterion of collateral order
exception because order conclusively determined where parties must bring action and order
was completely separate from merits of cause of action); Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 195-196
(same). But see supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that Chasser court declined to
discuss second criterion of collateral order exception because order failed to meet third
criterion).
120. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (listing cases that hold that denial of
motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause satisfied second criterion of collateral order
exception).
121. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing split among circuit courts that
have ruled on whether denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause satisfied
criteria of collateral order exception).
122. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 217 (1988) (holding that appellate court could review denial of motion to dismiss
based on forum selection clause after final decision); Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v.
Perkins, 728 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 890 (1984) (holding that
defendant did not show that denial of motion to remand to state court based on forum
selection clause would be unreviewable on appeal from final decision); FarmlandIndus., 806
F.2d at 850-852 (holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
satisfied third criterion of collateral order exception); Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196-197
(holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause would be unreviewable
on appeal from final decision because § 2105 prevented review).
123. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser court's holding
that § 2105 would not prevent review of denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection
clause); supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text (discussing Coastal Steel court's holding
that § 2105 prevented review of denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
after final decision). In addition to determining whether a denial of a motion to dismiss based
on a forum selection clause meets the collateral order exception, courts mention whether the
litigants asked the district court to certify the order under section 1292(b). See supra notes 1,
6 (discussing § 1292(h)).
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not a matter in abatement.'24 The Chassercourt, therefore, held that section
2105 would not prevent an appellate court from reviewing the order after
a final decision.'

5

The Chasser court further reasoned that because an

appellate court could correct an erroneous district court order after a final
decision, the order was effectively reviewable after a final decision. 126 In
contrast, the Third Circuit in Coastal Steel held that a district court's order

denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause was a matter
in abatement.

27

The Coastal Steel court, therefore, held that section 2105

2
prevents an appellate court from reviewing the order after a final decision. 1
The Supreme Court's decision in Chasser on whether a denial of a motion
to dismiss based on a forum selection clause is immediately appealable

should resolve the division between the circuits.

29

The Supreme Court may

also clarify the meaning of the phrase "matters in abatement" under section
2105.130

The Second Circuit in Chasser correctly determined that a denial of a
motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause is not immediately
appealable under the collateral order exception.' 3' The result reached by the

Second Circuit is consistent with prevailing practice and the purpose of the
final judgment rule. 32 However, the Second Circuit's reasoning is not
entirely persuasive.' 33

124. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser court's holding
that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause was not matter in abatement
under § 2105).
125. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (stating Chasser court's holding that §
2105 does not prevent appellate court from reviewing denial of motion to dismiss based on
forum selection clause).
126. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser court's holding that
denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause is effectively reviewable after final
decision despite increased expense to parties that continue action in potentially wrong forum).
127. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (discussing Coastal Steel court's
holding that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause was matter in
abatement under § 2105).
128. See Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghnan Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 196-197 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983) (discussing Coastal Steel court's holding that
appellate court could not review denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause
after final decision).
129. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing split among circuits that have
considered whether denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause met collateral
order exception).
130. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of phrase "matters
in abatement").
131. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 53-55 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 217 (1988) (holding that defendant could not appeal denial of motion to dismiss
based on forum selection clause immediately under collateral order exception).
132. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing similarities between forum
selection clauses and forum non conveniens); supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing
courts that have heard appeals from forum non conveniens motions after full trial); supra
note 5 and accompanying text (describing purpose of final judgment rule).
133. See infra notes 134-151 and accompanying text (evaluating Chassercourt's reasoning).
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Under the third criterion, an order is effectively unreviewable if the
litigant will lose forever the right decided in the order unless the order is

immediately appealable. 34 A denial of a motion to dismiss based on a
contractual forum selection clause is comparable to a denial of a motion
to dismiss based on immunity from civil service of process. 3 5 The Second

Circuit in Chasser described the right provided in a forum selection clause
as the parties' right to choose the forum in which the binding adjudication

of the action will occur. 3 6 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Van Cauwenberghe characterized a defendant's right of immunity from civil service of
process as the defendant's right not to be subject to a binding judgment of
a court. 3 7 The Second Circuit further stated that litigants do not lose the
right to litigate the claim in the forum simply because enforcement of the
forum selection clause is postponed . 8 Because a denial of a motion to
dismiss based on a forum selection clause is similar to a denial of a motion
to dismiss based on immunity from civil service of process, the Second
Circuit's reasoning in Chasser in consistent with the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Van Cauwenberghe.'39
However, applying the existing definitions of the phrase "matters in
abatement" under section 2105, the Chasser court incorrectly reasoned that

section 2105 would not apply to the order.'4 The Chasser court noted that
the Supreme Court has allowed litigants to appeal denials of forum non
conveniens motions after a final decision.' 4' Because the Chasser court
found that a forum non conveniens motion and a motion to dismiss based
on a forum selection clause were similar, the Chasser court reasoned that
the Supreme Court also would allow litigants to appeal a denial of a motion

134. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing requirement in Mitchell that
right protected by immediate appeal must be immunity from suit).
135. See supra note 35 (describing similarities between forum selection clause and forum
non conveniens).
136. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 55.
137. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1951-1952 (1988) (finding that
right defendant sought to protect did not include right not to stand trial); supra note 62 and
accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's holding in Mitchell that right order invades
must be right not to stand trial).
138. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser court's holding that
additional expense to litigants was not proper reason to immediately hear defendant's appeal
under collateral order exception).
139. See Chasser, 844 F.2d at 55 (rejecting defendant's argument that defendant would
lose right to litigate action in particular forum if not immediately appealable); Van Cauwenberghe, 108 S. Ct. at 1949-1952 (1988) (rejecting defendant's argument that defendant would
lose right not to be bound by judgment of particular forum if not immediately appealable).
140. See supra notes 29-40 (discussing Chasser court's holding that denial of motion to
dismiss based on forum selection clause did not meet definition of matters in abatement). But
cf. supranotes 95-101 (discussing Coastal Steel court's holding that denial of motion to dismiss
based on forum selection clause satisfied definition of matters in abatement).
141. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (stating that Chasser court noted that
courts have reviewed forum non conveniens motions after final decision).
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to dismiss based on a forum selection clause after a final decision. 142 The
Chasser court's reasoning that courts should not read section 2105 literally
because courts have ignored section 2105 is not persuasive. 43 Courts may
not ignore an applicable statute simply because courts have overlooked the
statute in the past.44 Congress enacted section 2105 to prevent review of
non-jurisdictional matters in abatement. 45 Even though courts have heard
appeals of denials of forum non conveniens motions after final decisions,
a court's denial of a forum non conveniens motion may be a matter in
abatement under section 2105.'4 A forum non conveniens motion may be
a matter in abatement because the motion, if granted, would terminate the
action, but would not prevent the plaintiff from bringing the action in a
more convenient forum. 47 Similarly, if an appellate court reverses a district
court's order denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause
after a full trial and grants the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
could bring the same action in the forum set forth in the forum selection
clause. 4 Both forum non conveniens motions and motions to dismiss based
on a forum selection clause meet the existing definition of matters in
abatement. 49 Neither motion affects the jurisdiction of the court. 50 Section
2105, therefore, appears to prevent review of both a forum non conveniens
5
motion and a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause.' '
Although the Chassercourt's reasoning that section 2105 did not prevent
appellate review of a denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum
selection clause is unpersuasive, the Chasser court correctly noted that
section 2105 does apply to an interlocutory appeal as well as to an appeal
after a final decision. 52 The Chasser court reasoned that section 2105 would
142. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing Chassercourts holding that
courts should not read § 2105 literally because courts have heard appeals of motions to dismiss
based on forum non conveniens).
143. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (stating Chasser court's holding that
because courts have ignored § 2105, § 2105 does not apply literally).
144. See supra notes 95-110 (discussing CoastalSteel court's recognition that literal reading
of § 2105 prevents review of denials of motions to dismiss based on forum selection clauses).

145. See 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) (preventing appellate review of nonjurisdictional matters
in abatement).
146. See supra note 35 (discussing similarities between forum selection clause and forum
non conveniens).
147. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (defining matters in abatement under
section 2105).
148. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing cases hearing appeal from

various motions regarding plaintiff's choice of forum as inconvenient for defendant).
149. See supra note 31 (discussing definition of "matter in abatement).
150. See supra note 33 (discussing FED. R. Crv. P. 12 governing jurisdiction).
151. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing § 2105 as preventing review of

nonjurisdictional matters in abatement).
152. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (stating Chasser court's reasoning that,
if § 2105 prevented review after a final judgment, § 2105 also would prevent review at
interlocutory stage); also supra note 103 (discussing reasoning of concurrence in Coastal Steel

that if § 2105 prevents review after final judgment, § 2105 prevents review at all stages of
litigation).
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also prevent review at the interlocutory stage because Congress did not
include exceptions to section 2105 and the Supreme Court has not created
exceptions to section 2105.15 The Chassercourt's reasoning is more persuasive than the Third Circuit's reasoning in CoastalSteel. 154 The Coastal Steel
court inaccurately reasoned that, because the Supreme Court created the
collateral order exception after Congress enacted section 2105, Congress
could not have intended section 2105 to apply to appeals under the collateral
order exception. 51 When Congress enacts a statute, Congress cannot anticipate every situation that the statute may cover in the future. 56 The Supreme
Court, therefore, could determine that section 2105 prevents review of a
denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause at any
point in the action.157 The Supreme Court, however, may bow to prevailing
practice and redefine the phrase "matters in abatement" so that it includes
neither denials of motions to dismiss based on forum selection clauses nor
denials of motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. 58
In Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines'5 9 the Second Circuit held that the
district court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss based on a
forum selection clause was not immediately appealable under the collateral
order exception. 60 Under the existing definition of "matters in abatement",
however, the Second Circuit's holding that a denial of a motion to dismiss
based on a forum selection clause did not fall under section 2105 is largely
unsupported.' 6' When the Supreme Court hears the Chasser case, the Supreme Court must interpret section 2105 and decide whether a denial of a
motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause is a matter in abate153. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing § 2105 as preventing review of

nonjurisdictional matters in abatement without exception).
154. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser court's reasoning
that § 2105 does not apply to denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause).

But see Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc. 806 F.2d 848, 850-51 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause immediately
appealable, but doing so under Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964)
and not adopting Third Circuit's reasoning that § 2105 applies only after final decision).
155. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text (describing Coastal Steel court's
reasoning that because Congress enacted § 2105 when no provisions existed for interlocutory
review, § 2105 would not apply to interlocutory appeals).
156. See supra notes 154-155 (discussing inaccuracy of Third Circuit's reasoning).
157. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (describing Chasser court's discussion

of whether denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause is a "matter in
abatement").
158. Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing definition of phrase "matters
in abatement"); supra note 6 (describing Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of collateral

order exception); supra note 7 (noting that Supreme Court has held very few interlocutory
orders appealable under collateral order exception).
159. 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988).
160. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing Chasser court's holding
that denial of motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause did not satisfy collateral
order exception and was not immediately appealable).
161. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing definition of "matters in

abatement").

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:287

ment. 162 The Supreme Court may follow the Third Circuit's reasoning in

Coastal Steel that section 2105 only applies after a final decision. 6 1 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court may decide to clarify the definition of
matters in abatement under section 2105 so that the phrase no longer
64
includes a denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause.1
Until the Supreme Court decides the Chassercase and adds meaning to the

phrase "matters in abatement", the Chasser court's determination that
section 2105 did not prevent review of the district court's order denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss based on the forum selection clause has little
support in the language of section 2105 or in judicial decisions. 65 Nevertheless, in light of prevailing practice and the purposes of the final judgment
rule, the Second Circuit in Chasser properly held that a denial of a motion

to dismiss based on a forum selection clause is not immediately appealable
under the collateral order exception.'6
DiANE U. MONTGOMERY

162. Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217
(1988).
163. See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's holding in
Coastal Steel).
164. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (indicating that Supreme Court has ability
to create judicial exceptions to legislative statutes, such as collateral order exception).
165. See 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982); also supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing
limited case law definining "matters in abatement" under § 2105).
166. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (describing Chasser court's holding
that § 2105 did not prevent review of denial of motion to dismiss, that denial of motion to
dismiss was reviewable on appeal from final decision, and that denial of motion to dismiss
based on forum selection clause did not satisfy criteria of collateral order exception); supra
note 35 (discussing similarity between forum selection clause andforum non conveniens); supra
notes 2, 5 and accompanying text (discussing final judgment rule and purpose of final judgment
rule).

